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Abstract 
Emissions trading systems are recognized as a cost-effective way to facilitate emissions abatement 
and are expected to play an important role in international cooperation for global climate mitigation. 
Starting from the planned linkage of the European Union’s Emissions Trading System with a new 
system in Australia in 2015, this paper simulates the impacts of expanding this international 
emissions market to include China and the US, which are respectively the largest and second largest 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emitters in the world. We find that including China and the US significantly 
impacts the price and the quantity of permits traded internationally. China exports emissions rights 
while other regions import permits. When China joins the EU-Australia/New Zealand (EU-ANZ) 
linked market, we find that the prevailing global carbon market price falls significantly, from $33 per 
ton of carbon dioxide (tCO2) to $11.2/tCO2. By contrast, adding the US to the EU-ANZ market 
increases the price to $46.1/tCO2. If both China and the US join the linked market, the market price of 
an emissions permit is $17.5/tCO2 and 608 million metric tons (mmt) are traded, compared to 93 mmt 
in the EU-ANZ scenario. The US and Australia would transfer, respectively, 55% and 78% of their 
domestic reduction burden to China (and a small amount to the EU) in return for a total transfer 
payment of $10.6 billion. International trading of emissions permits also leads to a redistribution of 
renewable energy production. When permit trading between all regions is considered, relative to 
when all carbon markets operate in isolation, renewable energy in China expands by more than 20% 
and shrinks by 48% and 90% in, respectively, the US and Australia-New Zealand. In all scenarios, 
global emissions are reduced by around 5% relative to a case without climate policies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A single global market for greenhouse gas emissions is widely accepted as the most cost-
effective path to climate change mitigation. As more nations establish national and regional 
emissions trading systems, interest has grown in the implications of linking these systems at the 
global level. So far, only a few markets for greenhouse gas emissions exist, and these exist at the 
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subnational level (e.g., California’s cap–and–trade program), the national level (e.g., the New 
Zealand Emissions Trading System) or at the level of a single economic group (e.g., the EU 
Emissions Trading System, EU-ETS). Australia currently has a carbon tax, but is planning to 
establish an ETS that will link to the European Union as early as 2015 (DCCEE, 2011). 
Meanwhile, China is currently piloting ETS designs at the provincial level with an eye to 
establishing a trading market at the national level (Guoyi et al., 2012). Although the latest 
attempt to establish a national emissions trading system in the US was shelved in 2009, several 
regional carbon markets have already been established (California Environmental Protection 
Agency Air Resources Board, 2012; Lavelle, 2010; RGGI, 2013), which may accelerate the steps 
to a national market in the US. Although a multiregion agreement is yet to materialize, the 
potential benefits of linking emissions markets across countries and regions are well recognized 
(Marschinski et al., 2012). Furthermore, the prospects for linking carbon markets in developed 
and developing countries have been widely discussed and are seen as a way to encourage 
participation by developing countries in a global climate agreement (European Union 
Commission, 2009; ICAP, 2007).  
   Ongoing efforts to link the EU-ETS with Australia’s ETS represent the first attempt to 
establish an international emission market since the EU-ETS was established in 2005. There are 
also plans to link the EU-ETS with California’s carbon market (Carus, 2011). Additionally, 
China has indicated that it would consider participating in an international carbon market, if 
plans to extend pilot programs to the nation level are successful (Environment News Service, 
2013; Guoyi et al., 2012).  The impact from linking carbon markets depends in part on the 
relative quantity of emissions in the two regions. For example, a linkage between the EU-ETS 
and a hypothetical ETS in the US has a larger impact on the EU carbon price than the linkage 
between the EU-ETS and a hypothetical ETS in Mexico (Gavard, Winchester, Jacoby and 
Paltsev, 2011).
 1
 In the setting we consider here, the markets involved have very different 
emissions levels. Total CO2  emissions due to the use of fossil fuels in Australia were around 383 
million metric tons (mmt) in 2010, compared to 3860 mmt in the EU, 7258 mmt in China and 
5762 mmt in the US (International Energy Agency, 2011). Consequently, linking the EU-ETS 
with a cap-trade program in China and the US is likely to have larger impacts on the EU permit 
price than linking this system with an ETS in Australia. This paper analyzes the impacts, 
including changes in carbon prices, emissions and welfare, of the proposed linkage of carbon 
markets in the EU and Australia, and the impact of China and the US joining this market. 
Several benefits from establishing an international ETS are clear. Notably, a global market 
provides more flexibility for parties to achieve emissions reductions at the lowest marginal cost 
across all covered sectors and jurisdictions. However, the impact of global trading may not 
always be positive for all parties. For instance, market distortions or trade effects can affect the 
relative advantages to each country of participation (Babiker et al., 2004; Flachsland, et al., 
2009a). Other authors suggest that emissions trading regimes may alter (for the worse in some 
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cases) the way that economic shocks are transmitted through international markets (McKibbin, et 
al., 2008). Therefore, tailored studies that account for the nature of commitments and the 
structure of each participating economy are required to evaluate supra-national climate proposals. 
For this analysis, we use a multiregional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Such 
models are well suited to the task at hand, as they capture linkages between energy and economic 
systems and interactions among regions (Marschinski et al., 2012). 
The remainder of this analysis is comprised of five sections. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and summarizes emissions trading programs in China, the US, the EU, Australia and 
New Zealand. The model and data used for the analysis are described in Section 3. Scenarios 
implemented in the model are described in Section 4 and results are presented in Section 5. The 
final section concludes.   
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Literature Review 
Broadly, the literature concerning linked carbon trading systems represents two areas of 
inquiry. One focuses on political and institutional barriers, and the other estimates the impacts of 
linked systems on economic outcomes and emissions. Studies focused on the political and 
institutional barriers to carbon market integration have identified major challenges. Tuerk et al. 
(2009) concluded that an OECD-wide carbon market by 2015 was unlikely, because supra-
national ETS integration is not a short-term priority in many countries, and that the benefits of 
such linkages may be offset by the cost of sacrificing other policy objectives, such as domestic 
CO2 price control. The authors also suggested that carbon linkages were most likely to begin 
among countries or regions with strong existing trade ties before expanding further (Tuerk et al., 
2009).  
Flachsland et al. (2009b) assesses the environmental effectiveness and political feasibility of 
top-down and bottom-up approaches to international carbon trading systems.
2
 Challenges 
identified by the authors include the risk of changing emissions reduction commitments as a 
result of political volatility, and the environmental impacts of individual commitments without 
global cooperation. Additionally, if participants in an integrated market determine their own 
emissions reduction targets, as is currently the case, international permit trading may reduce or 
neutralize environmental improvements. Such a situation will occur if member regions increase 
their domestic emissions targets to enable greater exports of permits (Carbone et al., 2009; 
Flachsland et al., 2009a; Helm, 2003; Rehdanz and Tol, 2005).  
Most studies that investigate the impacts of international permit trading employ CGE 
frameworks. Babiker et al. (2004) used a CGE model to test the welfare impact from 
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international emission trading. They find that, although international permit trading generally 
reduces the welfare costs of meeting emissions targets, trading can cause welfare losses in 
permit-exporting countries. This situation occurs when there are pre-existing tax distortions and 
permit trading interacts with and magnifies these distortions (Paltsev et al., 2004). Marschinski et 
al. (2012) adopted a Ricardo–Viner general equilibrium model to study the impact of sectoral 
carbon market linking on emissions, industrial competitiveness, and economic welfare. The 
authors find that global emissions can increase if the emission cap is not economy-wide in one of 
the “linked” countries, as changes in energy prices result in leakage to uncapped sectors. Gavard 
et al. (2011) simulated a carbon permit linkage between the Chinese electricity sector and an 
economy-wide cap–and–trade emissions market in the US. In this scenario, the US will purchase 
more than 46% of its capped emissions from China and pay China $42 billion. Similar to 
Marschinski et al. (2012), the authors also find internal leakage to non-electricity sectors in 
China.  
2.2 Emission Trading in China, the EU, the US, Australia and New Zealand 
Launched in 2005, the EU-ETS is a cornerstone of the EU’s policy to combat climate change. 
The EU-ETS is the largest emissions trading scheme created to date, covering around 11,000 
power stations and industrial plants in 30 countries (European Union, 2003; European Union, 
2012a). In its first phase (2005 to 2007), the ETS covered approximately 46% of the total CO2 
emissions in EU countries. Phase III of the EU-ETS began in January 2013 and will end in 2020. 
Phase III targets emissions reductions of 20% below 1990 levels by 2020 (European Union, 
2012c; Kopsch, 2012). The EU-ETS also expects to develop an international carbon market by 
linking compatible emissions trading systems (European Union, 2012b).  
The US has also seen efforts to develop emissions trading system designs. A recent effort to 
establish a national emissions trading market in the US was outlined in the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act in 2009 (ACES). Under the cap–and–trade system proposed by the bill, 
a cap was to be placed on national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions so that, relative to 2005 
levels, emissions fell by 17% by 2020 and 83% by 2050. (Waxman and Markey, 2009). The bill 
was approved by the House of Representatives, but did not pass in the Senate. Although a US 
national carbon market has yet to be signed into national law, several regional emission markets 
have been established. Specifically, an economy-wide emissions trading program operates in 
California (California Environmental Protection Agency, 2012), and the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI, or ReGGIe) caps emissions from power plants in several states in the 
eastern US (RGGI, 2013).  
In 2003, Australia was home to the first regional pilot (baseline and credit) emissions trading 
market in the world (the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme) but this 
regional market was not extended to a national market (Australia Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Scheme Administrator, 2012; Nelson et al., 2012). However, in 2011, the Australian Government 
passed the Clean Energy Act of 2011, which imposed a fixed carbon price of AU$23 per metric 
ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emitted from certain industries from July 1, 2012 
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(Australian Government, 2011). On July 1, 2015, the “carbon price” mechanism in Australia will 
switch to an “emissions trading scheme” (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 
2011), and a two-way link with the EU-ETS will be formed before the middle of 2018 (European 
Union, 2012b). However, the details of Australia’s emissions trading system, including the size 
of the emissions cap and definitions of covered sectors, have yet to be finalized.  
Plans for a carbon market in New Zealand were first framed in 2007 (New Zealand 
Government, 2007) and outlined in 2008 (New Zealand Parliament, 2009). The 2008 Act 
provided for a comprehensive ETS, ultimately to cover all sectors (including agriculture and 
forestry) and all GHGs under the Kyoto Protocol (Lennox and van Nieuwkoop, 2010; New 
Zealand Parliament, 2008). This act was subsequently amended to provide greater long-term 
protection to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed activities, and the inclusion of agriculture was 
postponed until 2015. Moreover, the New Zealand ETS does not place a hard cap on emissions, 
as the number of permits required to be surrendered by covered entities is based on emissions 
intensity (New Zealand Government, 2007). The New Zealand government has suggested that 
the carbon market may link to the Australian ETS starting in the middle of 2015, once Australia 
has established its domestic emissions trading system (MCCEE, 2012). Providing the EU and 
Australian carbon markets can be successfully integrated, such an extension would effectively 
link the New Zealand ETS with the EU-ETS. 
Since 2011, China has taken steps to establish its domestic emissions market. In its Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan (covering 2011–2015), the Chinese government announced its intention to 
establish a national carbon trading system by 2015. As the first step, the National Development 
and Reform Commission of China has initiated carbon trading pilots in five cities and two 
provinces in order to first establish regional trading markets covering over 2000 firms (Guoyi et 
al., 2012; Qi et al., 2012). Some regional markets, such as those in Shanghai and Guangdong, are 
already established and a pilot trading market began in 2013 (ChinaDaily, 2012; ). The success 
or failure of those experiments will to a large extent determine the future (at least in the near 
term) of carbon market developments in China. China has also signaled its intent to join an 
international ETS, once a domestic emissions trading system has been successfully established. 
3. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
This paper adopts the China-in-Global Energy Model (C-GEM) (Qi, Winchester, Zhang, and 
Karplus, 2013) to evaluate the energy and CO2 emissions impacts of linking carbon markets in 
China, the EU, the US and Australia-New Zealand (ANZ). The C-GEM is a recursive–dynamic 
general equilibrium model of the world economy developed by the Tsinghua-MIT China Energy 
and Climate Project, a collaborative effort of the Tsinghua Institute of Energy, Environment, and 
Economy and the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. In the model, 
there are 18 production sectors, which are listed in Table 1. These sectors are classified into six 
types of production processes: extraction of primary fuels (crude oil, coal and gas), production of 
electricity, refined oil production, energy-intensive industries, agriculture and other production 
activities including other manufacturing industries, transportation and services. Each of the 
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production processes is captured by a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. A 
typical detailed nesting structure for the six production activities is portrayed in Figure 1, where 
  is used to denote the elasticity of substitution between inputs. An important feature of the 
nesting structure is the ability of firms to substitute among fossil fuels and between aggregate 
energy and value added based on their cost competitiveness, which is influenced by energy and 
climate policies.  
Table 1. Sectors in the China-in-Global Energy Model (C-GEM). 
Sector Industry included in sector 
Crops Crops 
Forestry Forestry, logging and related services 
Livestock Livestock 
Coal Mining and agglomeration of hard coal, lignite and peat 
Oil Extraction of crude oil 
Gas Extraction and distribution of natural gas 
Petroleum and Coke Refined oil and petro-chemical products, coke production 
Electricity: Electricity production, collection and distribution 
Non-Metallic Minerals Cement, plaster, lime, gravel and concrete 
Iron and steel Manufacture and casting of basic iron and steel 
Non-Ferrous Metals 
Production and casting of copper, aluminum, zinc, lead, gold and 
silver 
Chemical, Rubber and Plastics 
Basic chemicals, other chemical products, rubber and plastics 
products 
Fabricated Metals Sheet metal products (except machinery and equipment) 
Mining Mining of metal ores, uranium, gems, other mining and quarrying 
Food and Tabaco Manufacture of foods and tobacco 
Equipment Electronic equipment, other machinery and Equipment 
Other industries Industries not included elsewhere 
Transportation Services Water, air and land transport, and pipeline transport 
Other Services Communication, finance, public service, dwellings and other services 
Domestic Output
KLE BundleAGRI EINT OTHR SERV
Labor Capital
σI_EVA
σK_L
Value-Added
Roil
σE_KL
Energy Aggregate
Elec
Non-Elec
Coal Gas Oil
σE_NE 
 
Figure 1. A typical nesting structure for the CES production function in C-GEM. 
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The C-GEM also represents 11 types of advanced technologies, which are listed in Table 2. 
Three technologies produce perfect substitutes for conventional fossil fuels (crude oil from shale 
oil, refined oil from biomass, and natural gas from coal gasification). The remaining eight 
technologies are electricity generation technologies. Wind, solar and biomass electricity 
technologies are treated as imperfect substitutes for other sources of electricity due to their 
intermittency. The final five technologies—NGCC, NGCC with CCS, IGCC, IGCC with CCS, 
and advanced nuclear—all produce perfect substitutes for electricity output.  
Table 2. Advanced technologies in the C-GEM model. 
Technology Description 
Wind Converts intermittent wind energy into electricity  
Solar Converts intermittent solar energy into electricity  
Biomass electricity Converts biomass into electricity  
IGCC Integrated gasification combined cycle (coal) to produce electricity   
IGCC-CCS Integrated gasification combined cycle (coal) with carbon capture and 
storage to produce electricity   
NGCC Natural gas combined cycle to produce electricity 
NGCC-CCS Natural gas combined cycle with carbon capture and storage to 
produce electricity 
Advanced nuclear Nuclear power beyond existing installed plants 
Biofuels Converts biomass into refined oil  
Shale oil Extracts and produces crude oil from oil shale  
Coal gasification Converts coal into a perfect substitute for natural gas 
Wind, solar and biomass electricity have similar production structures as shown in Figure 2. 
As they produce imperfect substitutes for electricity, a fixed factor is introduced in the top level 
of the CES nest to control the penetration of each technology (McFarland et al., 2004). Other 
inputs, including labor, capital and equipment as intermediate inputs, are parameterized based on 
engineering information for each technology (Qi et al., 2013).  
Wind/Solar/Bio-elec
σwsigm 
VA
Labor
σK_L_Eq
CapitalEquipment
Fixed Factor
Resource
σbres
 
Figure 2. CES production structure for wind, solar and biomass power. 
Bilateral trade is specified using the Armington assumption that domestic and imported goods 
are imperfect substitutes and are distinguished by region of origin (Armington, 1969). That is, 
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each commodity purchased in a region is a CES composite of a domestic variety and an imported 
variety, where the imported variety is a further CES composite of inputs from different regions. 
The C-GEM is calibrated based on the Global Trade Analysis Project Version 8 (GTAP 8) 
global database (Badri et al., 2012) and China’s official statistical publications, using 2007 as the 
base year. The GTAP 8 data set includes consistent national accounts for production and 
consumption activities (input–output tables) integrated together with bilateral trade flows for 57 
sectors and 129 regions for the year 2007 (Narayanan et al., 2012a; Narayanan et al., 2012b). 
The C-GEM replaces GTAP 8 observations for China with data from China’s official data 
sources, including national input–output tables and energy balance tables for 2007. To maintain 
consistency between these two datasets, the revised global database is rebalanced using least-
squares techniques (Rutherford and Paltsev, 2000). The C-GEM aggregates the GTAP database 
to 19 sectors and 19 regions as shown in Table 1 and Table 3 below.   
Table 3. Regions in the China-in-Global Energy Model (C-GEM). 
Region name Countries in region 
China Mainland China 
United States United States 
Canada Canada 
Japan Japan 
South Korea South Korea 
Developed Asia Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore 
Europe Union 
EU-27 plus Countries of the European Free Trade Area ( Switzerland, Norway, 
Iceland ) 
Australia-New 
Zealand 
Australia, New Zealand and rest of the world (Antarctica, Bouvet Island, British 
Indian Ocean Territory, French Southern Territories) 
India  India  
Developing 
Southeast Asia 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and the 
rest of Southeast Asia 
Rest of Asia Rest of Asia Rest of Asia countries. 
Mexico Mexico 
Middle East 
Middle East Iran, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia 
South Africa South Africa 
Rest of Africa Rest of Africa countries 
Russia Russia 
Rest of Europe 
Albania, Croatia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the rest of Europe 
Brazil Brazil 
Latin America Rest of Latin America Countries 
 
The C-GEM is solved recursively in five-year intervals, starting with the year 2010. The 
model is written in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software system and 
solved using Mathematical Programing System for General Equilibrium analysis (MPSGE) 
modeling language (Rutherford, 2005).  
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In C-GEM, CO2 emissions are calculated by applying constant emission factors to the fossil 
fuel energy flows of coal, refined oil and natural gas based on the 2006 Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (IPCC, 2006).
 3
 The 
emission factors are assumed to remain constant across regions and over time. CO2 emissions are 
introduced as a Leontief input together with fuel consumption. This implies that the reduction of 
emissions in production sectors can only be achieved by reducing the use of carbon-intensive 
fuels. In the current version of C-GEM, only fossil-fuel-related CO2 emissions are projected.  
4. MODELING SCENARIOS 
We develop five scenarios to examine the impact of international permit trading among the 
EU, the US, China and Australia and New Zealand, which are outlined in Table 4. Based on the 
expectation that New Zealand will link its market with Australia in 2015, we have represented a 
fully integrated Australia/New Zealand (ANZ) emissions trading market.  
In order to understand the impacts of expanding the size of the emissions market, we first 
simulate the model with no controls on CO2 emissions (No ETS) to observe “business-as-usual” 
emissions in each region. We then consider four policy scenarios: (1) a separate market scenario 
(Separate) that simulates the four regional emissions markets separately, (2) an EU-ANZ 
scenario (AE) that links the EU-ETS to the ANZ ETS, (3) a scenario that links carbon markets in 
the EU, ANZ and China (ACE), (4) a scenario that links carbon markets in the ANZ, EU and 
USA (AEU), and (5) a scenario that links markets in the ANZ, EU, USA and China (ACEU).  
Table 4.  Description of scenarios. 
Scenario 
Countries/regions with a 
separate ETS 
Countries/regions with linked 
ETSs 
No ETS None None 
Separate EUR, USA, ANZ, CHN None 
AE CHN, USA ANZ, EUR 
ACE USA EUR, ANZ, CHN 
AEU CHN ANZ, EUR, USA 
ACEU None ANZ, CHN, EUR, USA 
4.1 Policy Assumptions 
To assess the impacts of linking the three candidate trading systems, it is important to 
consider existing complementary policies that promote energy savings and renewable energy 
deployment through direct regulatory measures or other channels. For example, the EU and 
Australia have legislation to ensure that 20% of energy consumption originates from renewable 
sources by 2020, while China plans to accelerate the deployment of nuclear, hydro, and 
renewable energy through 2020. Given that the cost of deploying renewable energy is different 
in each region, emissions abatement costs and ultimately the distribution of emissions reductions 
                                                            
3 In this inventory, 94.6 metric tons of CO2 are emitted per exajoule from coal, while corresponding numbers for oil 
and natural gas are, respectively, 73.3 and 56.1. 
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in a linked system will be influenced by renewable directives in each region. These “current 
policies” are included in all scenarios (including the No ETS scenario) and are summarized in in 
Table 5. 
Table 5. Current policies and plans included in all scenarios. 
Regions Policy Description 
EU 
By 2020, at least 20% of energy consumption originates from renewable sources 
and there is a 20% improvement in energy efficiency (European Union, 2012c). 
US 
A 4% efficiency improvement is achieved by 2020 (ACEEE, 2013).  
China 
Targets for nuclear, hydro and renewable energy in 2020 set out in China’s 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan and Medium-Term Plan for Renewable Energy.a 
Australia 
and New 
Zealand 
By 2020, at least 20% of energy consumption is from renewable sources 
(Australian Government, 2012). 
a The government plan for the installed capacity of nuclear is 40 GW in 2015 and 70 GW in 2020; for 
hydro it is 290 GW in 2015 and 420 GW in 2020 (State Council of China, 2013; China electricity 
council, 2012); for wind it is 100 GW in 2015 and 200 GW in 2020; for solar it is 21 GW in 2015 
and 50 GW in 2020 (National Development and Reform Commission of China, 2007; National 
Energy Administration, 2012). 
4.2 Assumptions for the Emissions Trading System in Each Region 
The EU and New Zealand already have existing emissions trading systems, but Australia, 
China and the US have not yet finalized the structure of their domestic carbon market. In this 
paper, we make assumptions about the coverage of the emissions trading systems in Australia, 
China and the US based on available information and focus on the effects of linking carbon 
markets in different regions. The EU-ETS covers the power generation and energy intensive 
sectors (European Union, 2012a). For ANZ, China and the US, we assume that all sectors except 
agriculture are included in emissions trading.   
CO2 emissions allowances allocated to regional markets are based on their national reduction 
targets in 2020, as listed in Table 6. For the EU, the 2020 target is a 21% reduction in GHG 
emissions from 2010 levels (European Union, 2012a). In this analysis, we only consider CO2 
emissions. For the US, we use the 17% emission reduction target from 2005 levels by 2020 
stated in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman and Markey, 2009). 
For Australia, we employ their 2020 unconditional 5% reduction target below 2000 emissions 
level in all the sectors. Though New Zealand holds an intensity target rather than an explicit 
reduction target, we apply a 5% reduction to the composite ANZ region. For China, the national 
target for 2020 is a 40%–45% reduction of emission intensity based on 2005 levels (which 
equates to a 27% reduction in CO2 emissions intensity relative to 2010 levels). The combined 
emissions caps in the four regions reduce global emissions by around 5%. 
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Table 6. Emissions allowance totals for the EU, US, ANZ and China. 
  EU US ANZ China 
No Policy 2020 emissions (mmt) 1994 5703 492 11092 
2020 emissions cap (mmt) 1860 4790 351 10328 
Proportional reduction in emissionsa 7% 16% 29% 7% 
a Proportional reductions are relative to 2020 emissions in the No Policy Scenario. 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Emission Reductions in the Separate Emissions Markets Scenario 
We begin by examining the impact of separate (unlinked) emissions trading systems in each 
region. The carbon price is significantly different in each of the markets, as shown in Table 7, in 
large part due to the differences in the emissions caps applied. ANZ has the highest carbon price 
at $132/tCO2, followed by the US, ($38/tCO2), the EU ($12/tCO2) and China ($7/tCO2). 
Table 7. Carbon prices and emissions reductions results in the Separate Scenario.  
 EU US ANZ China 
Emissions reduction (mmt) 134 913 141 764 
Carbon price ($/ton) 12 38 132 7 
Welfare change (%) -0.01 -0.05 -0.58 -0.01 
The lower carbon price in China relative to other capped regions reflects the relative 
abundance of low-cost abatement options in this country and the small proportional reduction in 
emissions (although it is large in absolute terms compared to other regions). These differences 
are driven by (i) production technologies in China being on average older than those in the EU, 
the US and ANZ, and (ii) a large share of coal in total energy production in China relative to 
other regions. These attributes drive differences in CO2-intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of GDP) 
across regions. Specifically, in 2010, the emissions intensity of output in China was 1.59 kg CO2 
/US$, which is six times higher than the EU (0.22 kg CO2/US$) and three times higher than 
Australia-New Zealand (0.39 kg CO2/US dollar). The older, less efficient technologies in China 
mean that a greater reduction in emissions is achieved by adopting advanced technologies, and 
large use of coal in this region provides greater scope for reducing emissions by substituting 
away from this input towards cleaner fossil fuels or improving energy efficiency. 
Changes in electricity generation from advanced technologies and primary energy use are 
presented in Figure 3. Due to the carbon caps, less energy is consumed to support a similar scale 
of economic activity in the US (13% less), the EU (2% less), ANZ (31% less) and China (5% 
less). Significant proportional reductions in coal consumption are achieved in the US (29%) and 
ANZ (37%), as compared to more moderate reductions in the EU (9%) and China (8%). In terms 
of absolute numbers, the largest reduction in coal consumption occurs in China (8.9 EJ or 212 
million tons of oil equivalent, mtoe) which is about 70% of the EU’s total coal consumption in 
2010. Carbon prices also increase the cost competitiveness of renewable electricity. In the US, 
electricity generation from wind increases from 6 mtoe to 16 mtoe, and solar power doubles. In 
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the EU, renewable energy production increases by more than 20% (from 20 to 24 mtoe) and in 
China generation from these technologies increases by more than 25% (from 43 to 54 mtoe).  
 
Figure 3. Fossil fuel consumption (a) and renewable energy production (b) in the No ETS 
and Separate scenarios in 2020. 
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5.2 Impact of Linking Emissions Markets 
We now consider what happens when emissions markets are linked with each other. Results 
for the AE, ACE, AEU, and ACEU scenarios are presented in Table 8. Linking carbon markets 
in ANZ and China (AC) results in a carbon price of $10.6/tCO2, which is a significant reduction 
compared to the ANZ price ($132/tCO2) in the Separate Scenario. As the linked emission price is 
still lower than the carbon price in the EU market ($12/tCO2), the EU and ANZ both purchase 
permits from China in the ACE scenario, resulting in an international emission price of 
$11.2/tCO2. In this scenario, China sells permits for 164 mmt of CO2 emissions, 119 mmt to 
ANZ and 45 mmt to the EU. If China is not involved in the international carbon market, as the 
case in the AEU scenario, the global carbon price is $46.1/tCO2 and permits for 157 mmt of 
emissions are traded. In this scenario, permits are sold by the EU to the US and ANZ.  
Table 8. Carbon prices and emissions reductions under AE, ACE, AEU and ACEU scenarios. 
Scenario/ 
Region 
2020 emissions reduction a Change in 
abatement 
(mmt) b 
Carbon price 
(USD/t) 
International 
Transfer 
(billion USD) 
Welfare 
change (%) mmt % 
AE 
USA 913 16 - 38.5 - 0 
EU 228 11 93 33 3.07 -0.02 
ANZ 48 10 -93 33 -3.07 0.38 
CHN 764 7 - 7.2 - 0 
ACE 
USA 913 16 - 38.2 - 0 
EU 89 4 -45 11.2 -0.5 0.01 
ANZ 23 5 -119 11.2 -1.33 0.56 
CHN 928 8 164 11.2 1.83 0.02 
AEU 
USA 837 15 -76 46.1 -3.51 -0.01 
EU 291 15 157 46.1 7.25 -0.03 
ANZ 60 12 -81 46.1 -3.74 0.29 
CHN 764 7 - 7.2 - 0 
ACEU 
USA 416 7 -498 17.5 -8.7 -0.01 
EU 141 7 8 17.5 0.1 -0.01 
ANZ 31 6 -110 17.5 -1.9 0.48 
CHN 1364 12 600 17.5 10.5 0.13 
a Emissions reductions are expressed relative to the No Policy Scenario 
b Changes in emissions abatement and welfare are relative to the Separate Scenario. 
In the ACEU scenario, linking all carbon markets considered results in a permit price of 
$17.5/tCO2 and 608 mmt of permits are traded (compared to 164 mmt in the ACE scenario). The 
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US buys 498 mmt of the emission permits, accounting for 55% of its reduction target and ANZ 
purchases permits for 110 of emissions, accounting for 78% of its reduction target. Most of the 
permits are supplied by China and a small amount (1% of total supply) by the EU. Turning to 
financial transfers, the US pays $8.7 billion to permit suppliers and ANZ pays $1.9 billion, and 
the EU and China receive, respectively, $0.1 billion and $10.5 billion. The transfer to China is 
equivalent to 0.23% of China’s 2010 GDP. The observation that the EU is a net exporter of 
permits is perhaps surprising, but it is worth noting that existing renewables and other mandates 
essentially offer reductions towards the EU’s goal that are pursued regardless of the carbon price, 
making the EU an attractive source of emissions reductions. 
Welfare changes for each scenario are also reported in Table 8. In general, ANZ experiences 
the largest welfare gain (in proportional terms) due to international permit trading, reflecting 
relatively high abatement costs in this region. Global welfare increases by 0.02% in the ACEU 
scenario. Interestingly, not all participating regions gain from permit trading. This is due to the 
interaction between existing distortions (for instance, fuel taxes as well as existing sectoral 
policies within regions) and permit trading, as discussed in Babiker et al. (2004).  
5.3 Impact on Energy Production 
International permit trading minimizes the overall abatement cost within the covered regions. 
As a result, emission reductions may occur in different locations relative to the case in which 
cap–and–trade programs operate separately. Permit exporters will face a tighter emission 
constraint, which in return will require them to consume more low-carbon energy. On the other 
hand, permit importers will be able to use more fossil fuels and the development of clean energy 
will be postponed. Changes in fossil fuel consumption and electricity generation in the Separate 
and ACEU Scenarios are displayed in Figure 4. Coal consumption in China decreases in the 
ACEU scenario (by 7%), relative to the Separate Scenario. There is also a small reduction in oil 
and gas consumption in China in these scenarios. Reductions in fossil fuel use are driven by a 
combination of lower demand (due to higher prices), improved energy efficiency, and expansion 
of low-carbon energy sources. In the ACEU scenario, renewable energy in China expands by 
over 20%. The US, a permit importer, on the other hand, consumes 19% more coal, 11% more 
gas and 6% more oil than in the ACEU scenario relative to the Separate Scenario. Also in this 
scenario in the US, electricity from hydro and other renewables falls by 14% and 48% 
respectively. Changes in energy production due to permit trading are largest in the ANZ region. 
This region consumes 41% more coal, 35% more gas, 40% more oil and 90% less renewable 
energy in the ACEU Scenario compared to the Separate Scenario. Thus international permit 
trading redistributes production of renewable energy from permit importers (mainly developed 
economies) to permit exporters (mainly developing regions). 
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Figure 4. Fossil fuel consumption (a) and renewable energy production (b) in the Separate 
and ACEU scenarios. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this analysis, we study a hypothetical expansion of an international market for CO2 
emissions and simulate the resulting changes in energy use, CO2 emissions, financial transfers, 
carbon price, regional welfare and trade flows. We start from the planned linkage of the EU and 
Australian trading systems, and consider a full range of possible trading system combinations. 
Our results provide a plausible first assessment of the effects of linking trading systems based on 
currently announced emissions reduction goals through 2020. We find that introducing the EU 
(a) 
(b) 
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and the US into an ETS in particular has a large impact on outcomes in a linked system. We 
explain these outcomes as a function of the stringency of the cap (and the associated quantity of 
emissions reductions), the marginal cost of abatement opportunities in each market, and the 
interaction between existing sectoral policies and an expanded carbon market. 
First, we find that some regions are consistently importers of emission permits across all 
scenarios, while others’ status depends on the coverage of the linked market. Reduction targets in 
each region result in different quantities of CO2 reduction and, if markets are not linked, meeting 
these targets within territorial boundaries is very expensive for some regions. For example, ANZ 
must reduce a quantity that is large relative to territorial emissions (29%) but small relative to 
total emissions in a linked market setting, especially when the USA or China or both are 
included. This high territorial reduction burden translates into high marginal costs (and a carbon 
price of $132/ton in the unlinked scenario), and consistently makes ANZ an importer of 
emissions permits when included in a linked market. By contrast, the status of the EU as an 
importer or exporter of permits depends on which countries are included. If the EU, ANZ, and 
China are linked, China absorbs a significant portion of the territorial reduction burden of the EU 
and ANZ, which are importers of permits. However, if the USA is added, the EU actually 
becomes a very modest exporter of permits, and ANZ and the USA pay China and the EU to 
undertake some reductions on their behalf. Under the assumptions made here, the EU gains from 
joining a trading system that includes China but not the US, but it is worth noting that gains or 
losses from participating in a linked system (relative to establishing an isolated ETS) are 
relatively modest for all regions except for ANZ. This region faces the highest marginal 
abatement costs but accounts for only small percentage of the total reductions required, and so 
always outsources a large share of its reduction burden given the opportunity. 
Second, our results suggest that the interaction between existing region-specific sectoral or 
command-and-control policies and the internationally-linked emissions market is important. Any 
such policies that target reductions in CO2 emissions act independently of the carbon price (i.e. 
they are pursued regardless of the availability of more cost-effective opportunities), raising the 
average cost of reductions and the welfare cost of climate policies (Morris, Reilly, and Paltsev, 
2010). From the perspective of a linked international ETS, sectoral policies restrict the quantity 
of extra-territorial emissions that can be used to meet the cap. The EU has multiple sectoral 
policies that result in the EU undertaking some emissions reductions (e.g., by deploying 
renewables and energy efficiency) regardless of the international CO2 price. The fact that these 
reductions are predetermined is probably one reason why the EU is an exporter for reductions in 
2020 when the four regions are linked. 
Third, we acknowledge several issues that affect our results. Some of the trading systems we 
model cover all GHGs (e.g., the EU ETS and the proposed system in US legislation), while 
China’s climate policy has so far targeted only CO2. Including the full range of GHGs may alter 
the costs of emissions abatement. We also assume all sectors are covered within the markets 
comprising a linked ETS, but there are many potential designs that involve partial sectoral 
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coverage or offset arrangements that may increase the acceptability to policymakers of linking 
markets. 
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